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"ORGANS OF SOCIETY": A PLEA FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TRANSNATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTITIES
Rebecca M. Bratspies*
I think we need to put the corporate world on notice that they just cannot
move about the world, rape, pillage and plunder and then walk away from
something just because they are for-profit... .'
Transnational companies have been the first to benefit from globalization.
They must take their share of responsibility for coping with its effects.
2
INTRODUCTION
Transnational business enterprises (TNEs)3 emerged from the tumul-
tuous economic integration that accompanied the spread of global
capital. While TNEs had predecessors in prior centuries (the British
East India Company certainly comes to mind), modem TNEs are largely
a product of the post-World War II era.4 As primary beneficiaries of an
* Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law. Co-organizer with Prof. Russell Miller
(University of Idaho College of Law) of the Second Annual University of Idaho College of Law
International Law Symposium ("Post-Conflict Justice: From Malmedy to Halabja") at which
these ideas were first presented.
1. David Crane, Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity: Sierra Leone, Briefing
at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (May 16, 2003), available at
http://www 1 .ushmm.org/conscience/events/leone/leone.php#full.
2. Kofi A. Annan, Help the Third World Help Itself, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29,1999, at
A28.
3. Definitions of TNEs abound. There is much hairsplitting over whether the proper
terms are "multinational" or "transnational," "business entity," "business enterprise," or "cor-
poration." I have no desire to wade into that thicket, and adopt the term TNE solely as a matter
of convenience. When I use the term, I am referring to a profit oriented business entity that has
the capacity to locate production across national borders, trade across frontiers, exploit foreign
markets, and affect the international allocation of resources. This definition comes almost
verbatim from VIUAM ENGSTROM, WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS 6 (2002), available at http://www.abo.fiinstut/imr/norfa/ville.pdf. Engstr6m in turn
relied on PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 12-15 (1995).
Readers looking for a lengthy discussion of definitional principles should see, Luzius
Wildhaber, Some Aspects of the Transnational Corporation in International Law, 27 NETH.
INT'L L. R. 79 (1980), and sources cited therein.
4. If nothing else, the speed with which they can communicate and share information
distinguishes today's TNEs from their earlier predecessors. See Asbj0rn Eide, Globalisation and
the Human Rights Agenda: The Petroleum Industry at Crossroads, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
OIL INDUSTRY 25 (Asbj0m Eide, et al. eds., 2000). There are many books detailing the rise of
Michigan State Journal of International Law
increasingly borderless economic order, TNEs play a pervasive role in
world trade. They routinely operate across international borders; exploit
multiple national markets, and shift production, resources and expertise
from state to state. As such, TNEs are the most common face of what
has come to be known as globalization--economic deregulation, privat-
ization and trade liberalization across borders.5
Growth of TNEs has been largely insulated from the parallel evolu-
tion of human rights norms and expectations. In 1970, economist
Milton Freedman proclaimed that "the one and only.., social responsi-
bility of business" is to increase profits.6 This is still a real perspective.7
As part of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation process, many busi-
ness representatives appeared before the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission:
Some to take responsibility for their institutional part in the crimes of apart-
heid, more to declare that the realm of business is not and need not be con-
cerned with gross human rights abuses that they loosely collected under the
term "morals."8
While it is certainly beyond the power of TNEs to single-handedly
build democratic, decent societies in which to operate, these powerful
transnational business entities, one good one is MIRA WIU.Ns, THE EMERGENCE OF MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISE: AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO 1914
(1970); see also MUCHLINSKI, supra note 3, at 19-47.
5. By 1995, TNEs accounted for approximately 2/3 of international transactions.
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT
1995: TRANSNATIONALCORPORATIONS AND COMPETrTIVENESs at 39, U.N. Sales No. E.95.II.A.9
(1995), available athttp://www.unctad.orgITemplates/WebFlyer.asp?intltemlD=2430&lang=l;
see also The Relationship Between the Enjoyment of Human Rights, In Particular, International
Labour and Trade Union Rights, and the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational
Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 47th Sess., Agenda Item 8, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995//1 (1995).
6. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Businesses is to Increase Profits,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
7. See, e.g., The Good Company: A Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005; Marina Ottaway, Reluctant Missionaries, FOREIGN POL'Y, July-Aug.
2001, at 44. For a critique of this view, see David Kinley, Human Rights, Globalization and
the Rule of Law: Friends, Foes or Family?, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 239 (2002);
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111
YALE L. J. 443 (2001).
8. Crane, supra note 1. The sentiment, however, oozes from corporate testimony
before the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. See 4, 6 TRUTH AND RECON-
CILIATION COMMISSION, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICAN REPORT
(1998) for details on the intimate connections between various TNEs and the apartheid regime.
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entities routinely mold the contours of society to corporate liking. De-
spite fine rhetoric about "constructive engagement," the desire for pro-
fits has too often blinded them, and us, to the unsavory role TNEs have
actually played throughout the world.9
Because TNEs operate across national borders, beyond the constraints
of any one nation's domestic law, their actions are too often viewed as
beyond the reach of any law. This unique ability to elude national legal
systems makes TNEs ripe for greater investigation under international
law.'" To make this claim is not to deny the daunting nature of the task.
The sheer complexity of oversight has so far blunted calls for account-
ability for corporate bad acts. However, if "the business of business is
business,"'" then gross violations of human rights must have business
consequences. Otherwise, there is little incentive for abusive corporate
actors to alter their practices in ways that will protect and support human
rights.
Large natural resource TNEs, including oil giants like Enron, 2
Unocal,13 and Shell,' 4 have been dogged for years by allegations of
9. As Human Rights Watch noted, "In countries characterized by severe human rights
violations.... corporations often justify their presence by arguing that their operations will
enhance respect for rights, but then adopt no substantive measures to achieve that end." HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA'S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES 3 (1999).
10. One primary effect of economic globalization has been a weakening of state-based
accountability structures. For a critique of international law's slowness in responding to this
question, see Phillip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and
Globalization, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 435 (1997).
11. For some of the myriad articles making this claim see, The Good Company: A
Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 7; The Good Company: A Skeptical Look
at Corporate Responsibility, THE ECONOMIST (JAN. 22, 2005); see also Henry Miller, The
Business of Business is Business, PROJECT-SYNDICATE (July 2004) (comment written by former
Hoover Institute Fellow), available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentaries/
commentary-text.php4?id=1568&m=series.
12. For a detailed analysis of Enron's human rights record in India, see HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, THE ENRON CORPORATION: CORPORATE COMPUCTrY IN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
(1999), available at http:lwww.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron.
13. Unocal's relationship to the Burmese military and its culpability in human rights
violations associated with efforts to build the Yadana oil pipeline have been subject to a long-
running Alien Tort Claims Act case in California. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Unocal I]; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000),
affd in part, rev'd in part by Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. Sept. 18,
2002), vacated by Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003) (granting
en banc review) [hereinafter Unocal II]. The Unocal II court found that the evidence presented
by the plaintiffs suggested that the corporation knew forced labor, which it called the modern
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illegal violence, forced labor, and support of armed conflicts in pursuit
of their corporate interests.15 Similarly, private, for-profit military
actors, like Executive Outcomes and Sandline International, 6 have parti-
cipated in bloody conflicts around the world, and have often been paid
through swap transactions involving mineral concessions.17 As private
equivalent of slavery, was being used to build the pipeline and that Unocal was benefiting from
the use of such labor. The OECD acknowledges that these abuses along the Yadana pipeline
are, unfortunately, not unique. "Similar problems have occurred in connection with oil and gas
developments in Columbia, Congo-Brazzaville, Indonesia, Nigeria and Sudan." OECD, MULTI-
NATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN SITUATIONS OFVIOLENT CONFLICT AND WIDESPREAD HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES 11 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/31275777l.pdf. See also
Eide, supra note 4.
14. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 9 (describing a litany of serious
human rights abuses by Chevron, Shell and others); see also Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3293 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that plaintiffs' allegations that Shell participated in deportation,
forced exile and torture of the Ogoni people in Nigeria, as part of a widespread attack, satisfied
a claim for crimes against humanity under the Alien Tort Claims Act); see also Bowoto v.
Chevron, 312 F. Supp.2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (refusing to dismiss allegations that Nigerian
plaintiffs suffered gross human rights abuses at Chevron's behest, and with the company's
support, cooperation and financial assistance).
15. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SUDAN, OIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 48 (2003),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudanl 103/ (asserting that exploitation of oil by
foreign companies has increased human rights abuses and made oil into "the main objective and
a principle cause of [Sudan's] war."). For a more extensive account of TNE practices raising
human rights concerns, especially in conjunction with state security forces, see Craig Forcese,
Deterring "Militarized Commerce ": The Prospect ofLiabilityfor "Privatized" Human Rights
Abuses, 31 OTITAWA L. REV. 171 (2000).
16. Both companies have apparently disbanded, but appear to have reformed under new
names. Lt. Col. Tim Spicer, former head of Sandline now runs a company called Aegis
Defense, which was recently awarded a $293 million contract to coordinate security for Iraqi
reconstruction projects. Pratap Chatterjee, Controversial Commando Wins Iraq Contract to
Create the World's Largest Private Army, CORPWATCH, June 10, 2004, at http://www
.corpwatch.org/article.php?id= 11362. See also Khareen Pech, David Beresford, Africa's New-
Look Dogs of War, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Jan. 24, 1997. at 24; The Fog and Dogs of War, THE
ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 2004, at 45.
17. See David Shearer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1998, at 68. These
companies typically keep their terms of employment secret. For a discussion of the role
Executive Outcomes played in the Sierra Leone conflict and detailing financial ties between the
company and energy and mining companies that received concessions in Sierra Leone, see
David J. Francis, Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security or Inter-
national Exploitation?, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 319 (1999); Michael van Maanen, Saving the Sum
of Things for Pay: Executive Outcomes and Private Military Intervention in Sierra Leone,
INCITE, Oct. 1999, at http://www.geocities.comlCollegePark/Square/6130/olvolO3/michaell
.htm. See generally Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries As a Means of Violating
Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N.
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armies and as managers of mineral concessions, TNEs assume powers
resembling those of states. 8 Many of these TNE activities have been
the source of substantial allegations of human rights abuses.' 9 At other
times, various TNEs have supported, funded and benefited from human
rights violations perpetrated by the state. Rumor, anecdote and verified
instances of sensational abuses have combined to create an impression
that TNEs are beyond the reach of human rights law. Recent revelations
about the role corporate interrogators may have played at the Abu
Ghraib prison2 focused a new attention on the constraints, if any, that
bind TNEs to international norms.
Reining in these powerful, for-profit TNEs, many with resources and
activities that rival those of states,z l will be the central human rights
ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 57th Sess., Agenda Item 7, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/27 par. 85, 96,
98 (1996); IAN SMIUIE, LANSANA GBERIE & RALPH HAZLETON, THE HEART OF THE MATrER:
SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS & HUMAN SECURrrY (2000).
18. For an exploration of the "state-like" powers wielded by some TNEs, see, e.g., Chris
Jochnick, Confronting the Impunity of Non-state Actors: New Fields for the Promotion of
Human Rights, 21 HuM. RTs. Q. 56 (1999) (describing Texaco's activities in Ecuador's
Amazonian region as "a state unto itself."); Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Tracy
Higgins, No Recourse: Transnational Corporations and the Protection of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27 FORDHAM L. REv. 1663 (2004) (documenting the various state
functions assumed by TNEs in Bolivia.); Jim Lobe, Papua Killings Could Set Back U.S. Plans,
ASIA TIMEs, Sept. 18, 2002, available at http://atimes0l.atimes.com/atimes/SoutheastAsia/
DI18Ae04.html (noting that the military in Papua "has often acted as partners or agents for
foreign companies").
19. See Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. SCOR,
U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (2002) (concluding that the drive to control natural resources was a
major motive of the war). See also HUMANRIGHTSWATCH, supra note 12; Presbyterian Church
of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting defendant's
contention that corporations cannot violate international law in light of plaintiffs' allegations
of corporate participation in war crimes, torture, enslavement and genocide in conjunction with
Sudanese oil production); OECD, supra note 13, at 3-4.
20. See Seymour Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004
(quoting Major General Antonio M. Taguba's report that "Army intelligence officers, CIA
agents, and private contractors 'actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental
conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses"'); MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA,
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, part 2, 30 at
http://news.findlaw.comhdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html#ThRl.12 (last visited Feb. 21,2005)
(implicating two private companies (Titan and CACI) and some of their employees in the
abusive conduct at the prison). While the duties of the United States, its officers and agents are
relatively clear under international human rights and humanitarian law, those of "private con-
tractors," and the companies that provide them, are more ambiguous.
21. TNEs account for more than a quarter of the world's economic activity, control a
quarter of the world's productive assets, and employ over 54 million people. See UNITED
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challenge for the twenty-first century. There is no other way to ensure
respect for human rights in a world increasingly peopled by powerful
actors who are neither states nor individuals. One need not expect TNEs
to "proactively create positive societal value"22 in order to demand that
they adhere to the samejus cogens norms to which we hold individuals
and states.
I. WHO MUST RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS?
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights assigns individuals,
states and "organs of society" the duty to promote and protect human
rights.23 The term "organs of society" is left undefined, but obviously
refers to entities not captured by the terms "individuals" or "states."
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2002:
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS, U.N. Sales No. E.02.II.D.4
(2002), available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=2574&intltemD
=2477&lang=1 &mode=downloads; see also Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The
Rise of Global Corporate Power, CORPWATCH, Dec. 4, 2000, at http://www.corpwatch.org/
article.php?id=377. The 20 largest TNEs have annual incomes greater than those of 80 develop-
ing countries. See SILVA DANAILOV, THE ACCOUNTABILITY oFNoN-STATE ACTORS FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: THE SPECIAL CASE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 11 (1998), at
http:llwww.humanrights.ch/cms/pdf/000303_danailov-studie.pdf. Simens AG, for example,
has annual sales that exceed the combined GDP of Chile, Costa Rica, and Ecuador. Compare
SIEMENS AG, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-AT A GLANCE, at http://www.siemens.comlindex
.jsp?sdc p=t4cz3su20o 1228673pGB04flmi I 227322&sdcsid=2260046987&sdc_bcpath= 12
26722.s_0,: 1226694.s_0,& (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) with WORLD BANK, TOTAL GDP 2003,
at http://www.worldbank.orgldataldatabytopic/GDP.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). See also
William Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory versus Quantitative Analysis, 18 HUM. RTS.
Q. 368 (1996). In 2003, Exxon-Mobil's revenues totaled almost $247 billion, while Chad's
GDP (a state in which Exxon-Mobil is active) was $2.65 billion. Compare EXXONMOBIL, 2003
SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT, 32 at http://www2.exxonmobil.comcorporate/files/corporate/
ExxonMobilAR2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) with WORLD BANK, supra.
22. JANE NELSON, THE BUSINESS OF PEACE: THE PRIVATE SECTOR AS A PARTNER IN
CONFIucT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION 7 (2000).
23. International Bill of Human Rights: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 72, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
While the Universal Declaration is neither a treaty nor a statute, and thus not a binding inter-
national document, its main principles have come to embody a universally accepted vision of
human rights. Louis Henkin, Chief Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations,
has characterized the Declaration in this fashion: "[e]very individual includes juridical persons.
Every individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no company, no market, no cyber-
space. The Universal Declaration applies to them all." Louis Henkin, The Universal Declara-
tion at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 17, 25 (1999). See also
Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 803 (2002).
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Even in 1948, it was already clear to the Universal Declaration's drafters
that the individual/state dichotomy no longer fully captured the complex
relationships that make up modem society. New power relationships
enabled new abuses of power, or, more accurately, enabled a new set of
actors to be potential rights abusers. Perhaps to encompass these new
relationships, Article 29 of the Universal Declaration states that "every-
one has duties to the community. "24
By any definition, TNEs are important "organs of society." They own
property; pay taxes; consume raw materials; generate goods, services
and wastes; and play a central role in the lives of their workers and cus-
tomers. Additionally, TNEs routinely lay claim to the rights espoused
by the Universal Declaration, most particularly the right to own pro-
perty25 and the right to freedom of opinion and expression.26
However, even while claiming some Universal Declaration rights,
TNEs have argued, so far successfully, against any legal responsibility
to abide by thejus cogens norms enshrined in the Universal Declaration.
Corporate participation in, and sponsorship of, killings, torture, forced
labor, and other atrocities therefore remains a grey area-the indignities
themselves plainly violate international law, but victims frequently have
no remedy against the corporate sponsor. Individuals may be culpable
for their role in corporate abuses but there is no international law
mechanism for calling the corporation itself to account. A culture of
impunity, if not outright immunity, surrounds TNE activities.27 The
irony is that corporate actors are far more likely than are individuals to
24. See UDHR, supra note 23, art. 29, at 76.
25. Id. art. 17, at 74. TNE's frequently avail themselves of the protection of Article
17(2)'s prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of property. In addition, a web of over 200 bilateral
treaties among approximately 170 countries has given these private actors the right to engage
in direct arbitration with states.
26. Id. art.19.
27. One recent United States Alien Tort Claim Act case expressly rejected the conten-
tion that "'the law of nations simply does not encompass principles of corporate liability."'
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 308 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). In contrast, no less eminent scholars of international law than James Crawford and
Christopher Greenwood had submitted declarations asserting this interpretation of international
law. Id. See also Iwanowa v. Ford, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,445 (D.N.J. 1999) ("No logical reason
exists for allowing private individuals and corporations to escape liability for universally con-
demned violations of international law merely because they were not acting under color of
law").
20051
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be rationally deterred from human rights violations by the presence of
explicit legal consequences.28
The international community must step into this legal vacuum and
must clarify that TNEs are held to the same jus cogens norms as are
individuals and states.29 Only then will there be a fundamental core of
norms that are truly inviolable. Such a proposal is in keeping with
modern trends in corporate law.3 ° In today's world, business entities are
routinely subject to criminal liability for actions or omissions taken by
agents acting on the corporation's behalf.3' It is, moreover, a logical
consequence of current efforts to extend international criminal respon-
sibility to those who facilitate the crime of terrorism by financing it-a
central effort in the "war on terror."
Although this claim seems sweeping, I mean it in its most narrow
sense. Not every harmful act will render a TNE criminally culpable
under international law. The principle of international TNE responsi-
bility, like the principle of individual responsibility, should be limited
to those acts striking at the very heart of international humanitarian and
human rights law. When the conduct in question involves war crimes,
genocide, or other jus cogens norms, there can be no justification for
differentiating between corporate abuses of power and state or indivi-
dual abuses.
28. See Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate
Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REv. 468 (1988) (con-
taining a thorough discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of corporate criminal respon-
sibility); see also CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 63-83 (2d ed.
2001); E.T. Mitchell, A Theory of Corporate Will, 56 ETHICS 96, 103 (1946) (postulating that
the corporation itself can foresee the legal consequences of action, and therefore plan accord-
ingly, more readily than can individuals).
29. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
30. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (Feb. 1970) (recognizing that corporate entities are important institutions in
domestic law and "have an important and extensive role in the international field"). The
prospect of corporate liability raises important questions about scope. For example: will a
parent company be responsible for acts by its subsidiaries or business partners? Who within a
corporation must have knowledge before that knowledge will be attributed to the corporate
entity? These questions are the usual considerations of corporate lawyers and thus pose no more
insurmountable hurdles in this context than in others.
31. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Is International Law Moving Towards Criminalization?,
9 EUR. J. INT'LL. 18, 20 (1998).
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A. Nuremberg Casts a Giant Shadow
The Nuremberg Tribunals were the first significant international
attempt to prosecute grave violations of humanitarian law and human
rights 2-- rights that we now presumptively believe will be vindicated
and respected by international law. Along with recognizing individuals
as holders of international rights, Nuremberg recognized individuals as
actors in the international arena that were capable of upholding or
violating international law. During its very first session, the United
Nations' General Assembly affirmed the Nuremberg principles as part
of the bedrock of international law.33 Thus, in the post-Nuremberg
world, individual responsibility exists alongside state responsibility.
One key rationale for imposing responsibility directly on individuals
was to make it impossible for individuals to hide behind the abstraction
of the state.34 In the words of the Nuremberg Tribunal:
enough has been said to show that individuals can be punished for violations
of international law. Crimes against international law are committed by men,
32. Although some have cast aspersions on Nuremberg as "victors' justice," see, e.g.,
Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg,
Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725, 764 (1999), more have
argued for the essential fairness of the proceedings. See THEODORE MERON, From Nuremberg
to The Hague, in WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE-EsSAYS 198 (1998). For a
contemporaneous rejection of this charge, see generally SHELDON GLUECK, WAR
CRIMINALs-THEm PROSECUTION & PUNISHMENT (1944). Justice Richard Goldstone, the first
prosecutor of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunal, and member of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, also rejects the characterization of Nuremberg as victor's justice.
"It is not really fair to criticize Nuremberg by today's standards. By the standards of 1945 that
there was a trial at all was a huge step forward. Moreover, it was not that unfair of a trial. There
were acquittals of some of the defendants. I suggest that one should test the fairness of courts
not by their convictions but by their acquittals. I always feel rather satisfied when there are
acquittals in the Yugoslavia or the Rwanda Tribunal because I think that is the best indication
that the system is working efficiently and fairly." Justice Richard Goldstone, The Trial of
Saddam Hussein: What Kind of Court Should Prosecute Saddam Hussein and Others for
Human Rights Abuses?, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1490, 1493 (2004).
33. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter ofthe
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(l), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/95(I) (1946).
The Nuremberg principles thus became customary international law. That same day, the
General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the crime of genocide as "shock[ing] the
conscience of mankind." The Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/Res/96(I) (1946).
34. As originally conceived, human rights were held by individuals vis-A-vis the state.
Only the state had obligations, both positive and negative, to ensure these rights. Nuremberg
was a solid rejection of this vision of human rights.
20051
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not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.35
These words have sometimes been interpreted as precluding liability
for corporations-another abstraction. This is a misreading. After
Nuremberg, individual culpability exists side-by-side with state respon-
sibility, it does not replace it. 36 Without an overarching vision of state
responsibility, international law could not hope to confront the systemic
nature of state policies that violate human rights and humanitarian law.
Just as there are individual and state international crimes against human-
ity, so to there should be individual crimes and corporate crimes against
humanity.
As Nuremberg prevented the individual from hiding behind the
abstraction of the state, it surely should not be interpreted to permit
corporations to hide behind their own abstraction. Unfortunately how-
ever, the careful balance struck by Nuremberg, and later by the United
Nations, between individual and state culpability has no parallel in
current international law vis 6 vis individuals and corporations. While
individual actors can be held individually liable for their part in corpor-
ate crimes against humanity, the corporate entity itself escapes respon-
sibility for systemic corporate policies that violatejus cogens norms. It
does so by claiming to be a legal abstraction.
35. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 223 (1947). Although much about Nuremberg represented a clear break with past
visions of accountability, the proposition that international law imposed duties and liabilities
upon individuals as well as upon States was not exactly novel. In a World War II case that has
recently resurfaced as the Bush Administration's source for the designation "enemy combatant,"
the Supreme Court wrote: "[flrom the very beginning of its history this Court has.., applied
the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of
war the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals." Ex parte
Quirin, 317 US 1, 10 (1942). The Court then provided a list of cases where individual offenders
had been charged with offenses against the "laws of nations." The Bush Administration's broad
interpretation of Quirin was called into question by Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2nd Cir.
2003), and was rejected in part in Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004)..
36. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Rogue Regimes and the Individualization of Inter-
national Law, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 815, 816-18 (2002) (a brief recap of the evolution from
purely state-based international law to international law that includes individuals and groups).
Readers looking for a detailed discussion of individual responsibilities and rights under
international law will find ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1993)
both useful and interesting.
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Under current interpretations, even business entities systematically
employing slave labor,37 or intentionally resorting to disappearances to
settle labor disputes,38 would escape accountability under international
law. Prosecuting individuals in the face of corporate policies that vio-
late jus cogens norms does little to confront the structural nature, or"corporateness" of the conduct. 39 The missing link is corporate respon-
sibility for corporate policies that violate basic international human
rights norms. We must close the gap between the standards that apply
to states and individuals, and those for "other organs of society" such as
TNEs. No actor, neither individual nor state nor "organ of society,"
should be able to violate jus cogens norms with impunity.
Of course it is not enough to merely suggest that corporate account-
ability would be a good idea. Unless corporate accountability is pos-
sible under international law, the conversation remains wholly hortatory.
The primary focus of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law is, and ought to be, the protection of individuals and
groups from abusive action by states and state agents. Because of this
focus, some have argued that there is no space in international law for
corporate accountability. 4 I disagree. In explaining how I reach that
conclusion, it helps to begin with the baseline of conduct that constitutes
international crime for which individuals can be held accountable.
37. In Unocal I, for example, the court found credible plaintiffs' allegations that Unocal
had knowingly employed slave labor. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 896 (C.D. Cal.
1997). The OECD indicates that Unocal's situation in Burma is not unique, and that similar
allegations have been made in many different countries against a variety of oil companies. See
OECD, supra note 13, at 11.
38. For example, see the allegations of corporate involvement in the murder of
Columbian trade union leaders contained in Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250
(N.D. Ala. 2003) (denying Drummond's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
39. As Peter French pointed out, corporate policy is much more than the intentions of
individual company directors, officers oremployees and is instead "a corporate long-range point
of view that is distinct from the interests and purposes" of the natural persons associated with
the enterprise. PETER FRENCH, CoLLEcIvE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 45 (1984).
40. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (containing assertion by defendant that corporations could not violate inter-
national law). Similarly, many corporations claimed, before the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, that corporate conduct had nothing to do with human rights.
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1. Individual and Group Responsibility at Nuremberg
At Nuremberg, various Nazi groups were found criminally respon-
sible for gross violations of international law.4 In particular, the Inter-
national Military Tribunal ruled that the Gestapo, the SS and the Leader-
ship Corps of the Nazi Party were criminal groups.42 These groups, qua
group, were declared criminal for engaging in slavery, mass murder,
aggressive war and plunder.43 In addition to these political groups, the
Nuremberg prosecutors set out to expose and punish German industries
that had participated in, benefited from, and promoted the atrocities
associated with the German war effort.
To that end, industrialists associated with Krupp," I.G. Farben 5 and
other major German industries were tried for crimes against the peace
and against humanity.46 The I.G. Farben indictment alone exceeded
sixty pages and alleged corporate participation in unparalleled
41. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 [hereinafter Nuremberg
Charter]. In particular, the Tribunal observed that Article 9 of the Charter gave it discretion to
declare an organization criminal and stated that "[tihis discretion is ajudicial one and does not
permit arbitrary action, but should be exercised in accordance with well-settled legal principles,
one of the most important of which is that criminal guilt is personal, and that mass punishments
should be avoided." TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 256. For a
thought-provoking series of essays on Nuremberg and its legacy, see FROM NUREMBERG TO THE
HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Philippe Sands ed., 2003).
42. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 35, at 261, 267.
43. Id. These prosecutions were based on the 1907 Hague Convention, in particular
on the Martens clause which provided that:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and
the rule of the principles of the laws of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of
the public conscience.
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the Convention
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in M.
CHERIFBASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONALCRIMINALLAW 638 (1992)
44. Case No. 58, Trial of Alfred Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and
eleven others, in 10 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 69 (1949).
45. 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1081,
1081-1325 (1952).




atrocities47 including crimes against humanity, mass murder, and exploi-
tation of slave labor at I.G. Auschwitz.48 Farben's embrace of Nazi
slave labor became grounds for criminal convictions for crimes against
humanity. In all, fourteen I.G. Farben executives were convicted of
gross violations of the laws of civilized nations. The convictions were
based, in part, on judicial findings that Farben itself had committed
international war crimes.49 Even though it had no jurisdiction over the
company, the Tribunal clearly treated Farben as itself violating inter-
national law. The opinion, along with J. Herbert's concurrence, leaves
little doubt that the Tribunal concluded that Farben itself committed
crimes against humanity.5" A similar result obtained in the Zyklon B
47. See JOSEPHBORKIN, THE CRIME AND PuNISHMENT OFI.G. FARBEN 137 (1978).
48. Id.
49. For example, the Tribunal concluded that "[a]ll of the defendants, acting through
the instrumentality of Farben ... participated in... the enslavement of concentration camp
inmates... and the mistreatment, terrorization, torture and murder of enslaved persons," and
that "Farben, in complete defiance of all decency and human considerations, abused its slave
workers by subjecting them, among other things, to excessively long, arduous and exhausting
work, utterly disregarding their health or physical condition. The sole criterion of the right to
live or die was the production efficiency of said inmates." TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra
note 46, at 50-51, 58. The Tribunal also found:
that the proof establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that offenses against property as
defined in Control Council Law No. 10 were committed by Farben, and that these
offenses were connected with, and an inextricable part of the German policy for
occupied countries .... The action of Farben and its representatives, under these
circumstances, cannot be differentiated from acts of plunder or pillage committed by
officers, soldiers, or public officials of the German Reich ..... Such action on the
part of Farben constituted a violation of the Hague Regulations.
TRIALS OFWAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 1140. The language of the decision makes it clear
that the court considered that the corporation itself had violated international law. The same
logic guided the court in a case involving the Krupp corporation, in which the tribunal states
that "the confiscation of the Austin plant [a tractor factory owned by the Rothschilds] ... and
its subsequent detention by the Krupp firm constitute a violation of Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations.... 9 TRIALS OFWAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILrARY TRIBuNALS
1352-53 (1950). Despite the Tribunal's language, Farben and Krupp received no punishment
for war crimes. In part because the Tribunal had no authority to impose criminal or civil
punishment on Farben and its ilk, slave labour questions remained unredressed, festering for
almost 50 years. Only in the last few years have these issues resurfaced in a spate of Alien Tort
Claims Act lawsuits. For a discussion of these lawsuits, see discussion infra Part II.A.
50. The Tribunal stated:
Where private individuals, including juristic persons, proceed to exploit the military
occupancy by acquiring private property against the will and consent of the former
owner, such action, not being expressly justified by any applicable provision of the
Hague Regulations, is in violation of international law.... Similarly, where a private
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trial, where the supplier of the gas used to kill concentration camp
inmates was convicted of complicity in international crimes."' The
convicted industrialists, and the companies they represented, were found
to have violated international law.52
B. Modem Incarnations of Individual and Group Liability for
Atrocities
Although the United Nations embraced Nuremberg as a basic arti-
culation of international law, cold warjockeying stalled implementation
of its legacy.53 Since the end of the cold war, however, the international
community has reaffirmed that violation of jus cogens norms triggers
individual criminal liability. The Yugoslav Tribunal,54 the Rwandan
Tribunal,55 and the International Criminal Court,56 all modeled in part on
individual or a juristic person becomes a party to unlawful confiscation of public or
private property by planning and executing a well-defined design to acquire such
property permanently, acquisition under such circumstances subsequent to the
confiscation constitutes conduct in violation of the Hague Regulations.
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 45, at 1132-33 (emphasis added).
51. Case No. 9, The Zyklon B Case, in 1 LAW REPORTS OFTRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
93, 102 (1947). As early as 1947, it was clear that commercial transactions conducted by
civilians could give rise to war crimes liability. Indeed the British Military Court rejected in
1946 many of the same claims we hear today from TNEs. Among the defenses rejected at trial
were claims that the CEO was too busy to be expected to know details of the business and that
no one in the company committed any crimes personally but instead merely sold a lawful
product with no control over the use to which it was put. Any reader of today's financial press
will find both those defenses familiar.
52. Although the convicted individuals were not party to international treaties, they
were held to standards contained in those treaties. The International Military Tribunal
concluded:
It is asserted that international law is a matter wholly outside the work, interest and
knowledge of private individuals. The distinction is unsound. International law, as
such, binds every citizen just as does ordinary municipal law. Acts judged criminal
when done by an officer of the Government are criminal also when done by a private
individual.... There is no justification for a limitation of responsibility to public
officials.
Case No. 48, Trial of Friedrich Flick and Five Others, in 9 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 1, 18 (1949).
53. See, e.g., GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 208-10 (1999).
54. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993)
(amended 2002), available athttp://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2005); see also VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995).
55. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1993), available at
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Nuremberg, explicitly provide that individuals are criminally account-
able for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and grave
breaches of the Geneva convention of 1949.
The Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals built on and expanded
Nuremberg's legacy. For example, most of the crimes against humanity
in the former Yugoslavia were committed by paramilitary groups and
armed civilian bands, rather than by state armies.57 In Prosecutor v.
Dusko Tadic,5" the ICTY directly confronted the question of whether
these private actors could be engaged in "armed conflict" for purposes
of crimes against humanity prosecutions. Drawing on Nuremberg, the
Tribunal decided that private actors could be criminally prosecuted for
their complicity in crimes against humanity.59
The Rwanda Tribunal built on Tadic in a fashion that tentatively
paves the way towards corporate accountability. In the Media Case,'
the ITCR recognized corporate facilitation of crimes against humanity
as itself an international crime. 6' The case involved prosecution and
http:llwww.ictr.org/ENGLISHIbasicdocs/statute.htn-l (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter
Rwanda Statute].
56. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July
17, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. The ICC has its roots
in General Assembly Resolution 260 of December 9, 1948 but it took 50 years and the end of
the Cold War to bring the court to fruition. The Rome Statute was adopted on July 17, 1998
and entered into force on July 1, 2002 and currently has 94 parties. The United States has not
ratified the Statute.
57. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780, UN SCOR, UN Doc S/1994/674 (1994).
58. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1, Decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber,
Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 128 (Oct. 2,
1995), available at http://www.un.orglicty/tadiclappeal/decision-el5l002.htm.
59. Id. paras. 128, 141.
60. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No.: ICTR-99-52-T,
Judgment and Sentence (Dec. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ngeze/judgement/mediatoc.pdf [hereinafter Nahimana].
The defendants were: Ferdinand Nahimana, the founder and principal ideologist of Radio-
Tdldvision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM); Hassan Ngeze, the founder, and editor-in-chief
of the newspaper Kangura; and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, an RTLM executive, and leader in the
political party Coalition pour la Ddfense de la Rdpublique (CDR).
61. There was no international conflict in Rwanda, so the statute of the Rwanda
Tribunal has been read as affirming that human rights and humanitarian law applies in all
contexts and is not limited to the international sphere. In particular, the Rwanda statute
recognized the criminality of violations of common Article 3 and of Additional Protocol H to
the Geneva Convention even in the absence of international war. Rwanda Statue, supra note
55, arts. 4, 6. Thus violations of common Article 3 are now both humanitarian law and human
20051
Michigan State Journal of International Law
conviction of the corporate directors of a radio station and newspaper
accused of inciting the Rwandan genocide.62
Even though the convictions were individual, (remember the ICTR
has jurisdiction only over individuals) 6 3 the Media case marked a big
step towards recognizing corporate criminal responsibility, with the Tri-
bunal identifying certain corporate acts as genocide and crimes against
humanity. For example, the Tribunal concluded that the Kangura news-
paper "instigated the killing of Tutsi civilians,"' and "paved the way for
genocide in Rwanda, whipping the Hutu population into a killing
frenzy."65 Similarly, the RTLM radio station 66 was found not only to
have created a general climate of terror, but to have instigated and
directed attacks on individuals who were tracked down and killed by its
instructions.67 Both Kangura and RTLM "explicitly and repeatedly, in
fact relentlessly, targeted the Tutsi population for destruction" by calling
"for the extermination of the Tutsi ethnic group."" Even more explicit-
ly than did the Nuremberg Tribunal in L G. Farben, the Media Case
acknowledged the reality that corporate entities can commit acts of
genocide.
rights law violations. See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 558 (1995).
62. See Nahimana, supra note 60; see also U.N. Tribunal Finds that Mass Media Hate
Speech Constitutes Genocide, Incitement to Genocide, and Crimes Against
Humanity-Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze (Media Case) 117 HARV. L.
REv. 2769 (2004).
63. Because legal entities are abstractions and any such policies and operations are
made and carried out by individuals acting in concert, there have been assertions that individual
criminal liability for international crimes is a sufficient response to the occurrences. I disagree,
and would agree with a characterization espoused by Bassiouni that this dichotomy is
tautological. Criminal responsibility of legal entities must necessarily be established through
proof of the conduct of individuals. To the extent that the actions of natural persons, even
conduct on behalf of a legal entity, are deemed criminal, the natural person may also be
individually accountable.
64. Nahimana, supra note 60, at 325. As early as Nuremberg, there had been
prosecutions for use of the media to incite genocide. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 547-49 (1948); Id. at 584-85.
65. Nahimana, supra note 60, at 318.
66. Nahimana, "the mastermind of RTLM, .... set in motion the communications
weaponry that fought the 'war of media, words, newspapers and radio stations' he described
... as a complement to bullets." Id. at 321. "RTLM was Nahimana's weapon of choice, which
he used to instigate the killing of Tutsi civilians." Id. at 323.
67. Id. at 165.
68. Id. at 320-21.
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C. The International Criminal Court and Jurisdiction Over Legal
Persons
The Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)
reflects international experiences with the Rwanda and Yugoslav
tribunals. 69 The drafters of the Treaty of Rome seriously considered
granting the ICC jurisdiction over TNEs and other legal persons. Until
its final draft, the Treaty included paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 23,
which imposed liability on legal persons. The original language of Draft
Article 23 provided in relevant part:
(5) [The Court shall also have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the
exception of States, when the crimes committed were committed on
behalf of such legal persons or by their agencies or representatives.
(6) The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude the
criminal responsibility of natural persons who are perpetrators or
accomplices in the same crimes.]7"
69. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in the statute's definition of crimes
against humanity. Crimes Against Humanity, in Article 7 of the Rome Treaty, include: murder,
extermination, and the deportation or forcible transfer of populations, torture, rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and enforced sterilization, persecution on the
basis of political and other grounds, and enforced disappearances of persons. ICC Statute,
supra note 56, art. 7(1). Crimes against humanity are no longer linked to armed conflict but,
to come within the court's jurisdiction, the criminal acts must have been committed "as part of
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population." Id. The term
"directed against any civilian population" means "a course of conduct involving the multiple
commission of acts.., pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack." Id. art. 7(2)(a). Similarly, Article 8 of the Rome Statute clarifies the acts
which will be considered War Crimes under international law. The listed acts include grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols. Building on
Tadic, these war crimes provisions apply explicitly to international and non-international armed
conflict. For an analysis of the elements of crimes against humanity, see Mohamed Elewa
Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the Elements of Crimes
Against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 73 (2004); Simon Chesterman, An Altogether
Different Order: Defining The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 10 DuKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 307 (2000).
70. Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/2/Add. 1 (1998) (citations omitted), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/
docs.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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From the beginning, this language was controversial.7 After weeks of
negotiation, the last and most developed draft of this section of draft
Article 23 was circulated. 72 This draft tied juridical person liability
much more explicitly to the culpability of natural persons acting on
behalf of the juridical person, stating:
(5) Without prejudice to any individual criminal responsibility of natural
persons under this Statute, the Court may also have jurisdiction over a
juridical person for a crime under this Statute. Charges may be filed by
the Prosecutor against a juridical person, and the Court may render a
judgment over a juridical person for the crime charged if:
a) The charges filed by the Prosecutor against the natural person
and the juridical person allege the matters referred to in
subparagraphs (b) and (c); and
b) The natural person charged was in a position of control within
the juridical person under the national law of the State where the
juridical person was registered at the time the crime was
committed; and
c) The crime was committed by the natural person acting on behalf
of and with the explicit consent of that juridical person and in the
course of its activities; and
d) The natural person has been convicted of the crime charged.
For the purpose of this Statute, 'juridical person' means a corporation
whose concrete, real or dominant objective is seeking private profit or
benefit, and not a State or other public body in the exercise of State
authority, a public international body or an organization registered, and
acting under the national law of a State as a non-profit organization.
6. The proceedings with respect to a juridical person under this article
shall be in accordance with this Statute and the relevant Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. The Prosecutor may file charges against the
natural and juridical persons jointly or separately. The natural person
and the juridical person may be tried jointly. If convicted, the juridical
71. There is a deep divergence of views as to the advisability of including
criminal responsibility of legal persons in the Statute. Many delegations are strongly
opposed, whereas some strongly favor its inclusion. Others have an open mind.
Some delegations hold the view that providing for only the civil or administrative
responsibility/liability of legal persons could provide a middle ground. This avenue,
however, has not been thoroughly discussed. Some delegations, who favor the
inclusion of legal persons, hold the view that this expression should be extended to
organizations lacking legal status.
Id. at 49 n.3.
72. Working Paper on Article 23, Paragraphs 5 and 6, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 183/C. l/WGGP/L.5/Rev.2 (1998).
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person may incur the penalties referred to in article 76.7' These
penalties shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of article
99.74
When, despite intense negotiations, it became clear that consensus
could not be reached in the time remaining at the drafting convention,
France, the language's primary sponsor, withdrew the proposal.75 As a
result, the final version of the Rome Statute granted the ICC jurisdiction
over only natural persons.76 According to Clapham, this rejection was
not due to any fundamental opposition to the principle of legal person
liability, but was instead attributable to a lack of time to resolve
differing traditions of corporate liability. 7 The fact that ICC jurisdiction
does not extend to legal persons should not blind us to existing and
emerging possibilities to assert international criminal jurisdiction under
international law.
II. The Need to Hold TNEs Accountable
The Universal Declaration of Human rights boldly declares: "No one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
73. The relevant part of Article 76 (Penalties applicable to legal persons) states:
A legal person shall incur one or more of the following penalties:
(i) fines;
[(ii) dissolution;]
[(iii) prohibition, for such period as determined by the Court, of the exercise of
activities of any kind;]
[(iv) closure, for such a period as determined by the Court, of the premises used
for the commission of the crime;]
[(v) forfeiture of [instrumentalities of crime and] proceeds, property and assets
obtained by criminal conduct;] [and]
[(vi) appropriate forms of reparation.]
Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, supra note 70, at 121-22 (citations omitted).
74. The relevant portion of Article 99 (Enforcement of fines and forfeiture measures),
states that "The provisions of this article shall apply to legal persons." Id. at 155.
75. For a discussion of the nuances of the statutory drafting process by an eyewitness
and participant, see Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International
Criminal Law Over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Convention on an International
Criminal Court, in LIABIrY OFMULTINATIONALCORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
139 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
76. ICC Statute, supra note 56, art. 25(1) ("The court shall have jurisdiction over
natural persons pursuant to this Statute.").
77. Clapham, supra note 75, at 157-158.
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or punishment.""8 There are no limitations or qualifications suggesting
that only states or natural persons, rather than all "organs of society," are
capable of violating this right. The prohibition is tied to the nature of
the criminal action, not the identity of the actor. In the last few decades,
there has been a growing recognition of corporate involvement in viola-
tions of jus cogens norms. Civil society has issued repeated calls to
"follow the money" and bring corporate actors within the human rights
and humanitarian law fold.
Perceiving the need for a check on TNE activities is one thing, taking
effective action is another. The international community has struggled
with the appropriate response. Left floundering without remedy, desper-
ate victims increasingly resort to the United States' Alien Tort Claims
Act in hopes of redress. The many corporate codes and guidelines
drafted in the last decades reflect the growing consensus that TNE
behavior must be constrained if we are to prevent and address atrocities.
While tort suits and corporate guidelines have their place, they are
simply not up to the momentous task that has fallen to them. They carry
neither the unambiguous moral condemnation of criminal sanctions, nor
the credible threat of punishment. The protection scheme cobbled toget-
her from these poor tools is hopelessly inadequate. The weakness of
these existing responses to corporate atrocities only highlights the urgent
need for definitive international criminal standards.
A. Civil Liability: Role of the Alien Tort Claims Act
Until 1980, the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) was a little-known
American law. Adopted in 1789, during the first session of the United
States Congress, the act promptly fell into obscurity, where it remained
for the next 200 years. The ATCA authorizes federal court jurisdiction
for "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States., 79 In 1980, this
78. UDHR, supra note 23, art. 5.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1350(1948). This language differs slightly from the original 1789 ver-
sion of the statute, but not in any substantive fashion. The original statute read: "[The district
courts] shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit
courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States." See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 304 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). In 1992, Congress added the




short, obscure statute was catapulted into the limelight when the family
of Joelito Filartiga, a Paraguayan who died under torture, successfully
used the ATCA to sue Joelito's torturer, Norberto Pefia-Irala, for viola-
tion of the law of nations. 80 This case proved to be a watershed. In the
years since Filartiga, the ATCA has provided federal court jurisdiction
for lawsuits from victims of international human rights violations seek-
ing to vindicate their rights under international law. 8'
After the Second Circuit, in Kadic v. Karadzic, held that international
norms subject to ATCA jurisdiction apply equally to private actors and
to government officials,82 plaintiffs began filing ATCA cases against
corporations. The first such case was against Unocal Corporation,
alleging that the company was liable for abuses committed by the
Burmese government in furtherance of the joint venture building of the
Yadana pipeline. 83 Similar suits were filed against a host of other com-
panies, with mixed success. Although recovery has been rare, the cases
draw attention to human rights violations and to TNE complicity with
violations of international law.
80. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Pefia-Irala, who lived in New
York when the lawsuit was filed, had been the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion,
Paraguay at the time of Filartiga's death.
81. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); In re
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d
Cir. 1996); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72
F.3d 844 (11 th Cir. 1996).
82. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43. Kadic involved claims of gross Human Rights
abuses including genocide, torture and war crimes against Radovan Karadzic, leader of the self-
proclaimed and unrecognized Bosnian Serb "Republic of Srpska" located within Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The Kadic court ruled that the international prohibition against genocide applies
to all actors, including private citizens. In particular, the court noted that Article IV of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, for the United States, Feb. 23, 1989), prohibits
genocide regardless of whether committed by public officials or private individuals. Id.
83. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110
F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2002
WL 31063976 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), vacated by Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2003 WL 359787
(9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003) (granting en banc review). When the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 821 (2003), the 9th Circuit stayed Doe v.
Unocal Corp. pending that decision. The Supreme Court decided Alvarez-Machain on June 29,
2004. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). On December 12, 2004, the day before
the scheduled rehearing en banc, the parties issued a joint statement announcing that Unocal
would pay unspecified moneys to settle the lawsuit. William Baue, Unocal Alien Tort Claims
Act Settlement Boosts Corporate Accountability, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 16, 2004, at
http://www.institutionalshareowner.con/article.mpl?sfArticleld= 1591.
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At the same time, the Nuremberg prosecutions became the foundation
for a series of ATCA lawsuits demanding reparations from Volkswagen,
Bosch, Bayer, I.G. Farben and a lengthy list of other companies accused
of profiting through use of slave labor during World War If." These
cases prompted the German government to establish the "Remembrance,
Responsibility and the Future" German Slave Labor Fund, a $7.5 billion
fund jointly funded by the implicated firms and the German government.
This fund intended to provide modest payments to victims of the Nazi
regime, including slave laborers, in exchange for legal peace for German
industry. A similar fund of $1.25 billion was established to settle claims
against Swiss banks for unjust enrichment at the expense of Nazi
victims.8 5 Together with other ATCA cases, these Nazi-era claims, and
more importantly, their settlements, have begun to establish a baseline
of civil accountability for corporate crimes that violate international
human rights and humanitarian law.
This past term, in Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court refused an
invitation to wholly eviscerate the ATCA.86 By a 6-3 vote, the Court
ruled that the ATCA permits federal district courts to hear private causes
of action for a narrow category of torts committed in violation of the law
of nations.8 7 The Bush administration had argued vociferously that
84. In re Nazi Era Cases against German Defendants, 198 F.R.D. 429 (D.N.J. 2000).
There are numerous web resources providing information about the corporations involved in
these lawsuits and settlements. See Financial Compensation for Nazi Slave Laborers, at
http://www.religioustolerance.org/fin-nazi.htm (last visited Feb. 21,2005); German Firms That
Used Slave or Forced Labor During the Nazi Era (Jan. 27, 2000), at http://www.us-
israel.org/jsource/Holocaust/germancos.html. For a complete list of Holocaust litigation,
including slave labor claims see Michael J. Bazyler, Litigating the Holocaust, 33 U. RICH. L.
REV. 601 (1999) and Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in
United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 1 (2000).
85. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y.
2000); In re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litigation, 80 F. Supp. 2d 164 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); see generally Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks and International
Human Rights, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325 (1998).
86. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. 2739.
87. Id. at 2761. The defense arguments, joined by numerous corporate amici and the
Department of Justice, had prominently featured an earlier concurring opinion by Judge Bork
that the ATCA provided only jurisdiction and not an independent cause of action. Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 810-16 (Bork, J., concurring). Such an interpretation
would have eviscerated human rights application of the ATCA. Despite judicial near unanimity
rejecting this interpretation of the ATCA, corporate defendants in other ATCA cases have
extensively argued for Judge Bork's interpretation. See e.g., Supplemental Brief of Defendants-
Appellees, Doe v. Unocal Corp., filed April 23, 2003, available at http://www.unocal.com/
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ATCA cases must be dismissed as interfering with foreign policy.88 The
Alvarez-Machain court did not wholly adopt this proposition, but did
recommend that courts be "particularly wary of impinging on the discre-
tion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign
affairs."89 That raises the potential that the ATCA will be reduced'to a
mechanism available only where there is no risk of embarrassing state
relations.9" The United States cannot single-handedly use its national
law to enforce international norms without raising questions about
whether ATCA cases are selective proceedings favoring U.S. domestic
policies.9
myanmar/enbancjbrief.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2005); Brief for the United States of America
as Amicus Curiae, May 8, 2003, available at http://www.unocal.com/ myanmar/doj.pdf (last
visited Feb. 21, 2005). However, the Alvarez-Machain court's rejection of this interpretation
appears to have put this particular controversy to rest.
88. See, e.g., Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellees, Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1996); Brief for the United
States in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739
(2004); Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). The Bush Administration had made this argument in other
ATCA cases as well. See, inter alia, Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae,
Doe v. Unocal Corp, 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002) (No. 00-56603); Nat'l
Coalition Gov't of Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (reprinting
a letter to the court from the Department of Justice asserting this position). By contrast, the
Departments of Justice and State filed amicus briefs in Filartiga endorsing use of the ATCA to
sue for violations of international law. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 680 F.2d 876 (1980) (79-6090); see also Brief of the United
States Supporting Jurisdiction, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). For a critique
of the current Bush administration's stance, see Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances:
The Bush Administration's Efforts To Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
169 (2004).
89. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2763.
90. The scholarly debate on the scope of the ATCA is voluminous. For an expansive
reading of the ATCA, see Richard B. Lillich, International Human Rights Law in US Courts,
2 J. TRANSNAT'LL. & POL'Y 1 (1993); Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human
Rights Litigation through Domestic Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT'L& COMP. L. REv. 401 (2001);
Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of
Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'LL. 1 (2002);
Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication of International Human Rights Violations
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 539 (1997). But see Curtis A. Bradley, The
Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CFII. J. INT'L L. 457 (2001); Michael D.
Ramsey, Multinational Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: Some Structural
Concerns, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 361 (2001).
91. See Jacques deLisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A
"Sinical" Look at the Use of U.S. Litigation to Address Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 52
DEPAUL L. REv. 473 (2002) (exploring though ultimately rejecting the contention that ATCA
cases against Chinese officials interfere with foreign affairs).
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Even putting these questions of international legitimacy to one side,
the ATCA cannot fill the international law void left by failure to extend
criminal accountability to TNEs. While ATCA actions have symbolic
value, they hardly qualify as an effective means to deter and punish
massive human rights violations. A civil award carries nothing like the
moral weight of criminal law, and few ATCA claimants actually receive
compensation, even after a favorable judgment.92 Moreover, ATCA
claims are limited to those situations in which there has not only been
an egregious human rights violation, but where the perpetrator is subject
to personal jurisdiction within the United States, and the plaintiff can
overcome standing, statute of limitations and forum non conveniens
objections. These procedural hurdles, which have blocked a full hearing
of most reported ATCA cases,93 underscore the need for a multilateral
and consistent mechanism for bringing corporate perpetrators to
account.
B. Codes, Compacts and Other Soft Law
The proliferation of these soft law instruments is a poignant reminder
of the desperate need for corporate accountability in an ever more
globalized world. Many of the codes and guidelines governing corpor-
ate conduct explicitly state that legal persons have a duty not to engage
in war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or torture. The
United Nation's Global Compact,' the ILO Declaration,95 the OECD's
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 96 and the recent UN Norms on
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
92. See generally TORTURE AS TORT (Craig Scott ed., 2001).
93. Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights against Multinational Corporations
Under United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Problems, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 493
(Supp. 2002).
94. The Global Compact website states in its overview: "The Global Compact is not a
regulatory instrument-it does not "police", enforce or measure the behavior or actions of
companies." The Global Compact, What is the Global Compact, at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
95. International Labour Organization, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work (June 1998), at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static
-jump?var-language=EN&varpagename=DECLARATIONTEXT.




Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights97 are but a few of the most
notable.
These soft law instruments highlight the varied roles TNEs and other
legal persons can play in war crimes and human rights abuses. The
Global Compact, in particular, reaffirms that the Universal Declaration
applies to corporate entities as well as to governments.98 The recent UN
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations go even
further in recognizing that TNEs can commit or participate in human
rights abuses. Paragraph 18 of the Norms are an explicit prohibition:
"[TNEs] shall not engage in nor benefit from war crimes, crimes against
humanity... [and] other violations of human rights and humanitarian
law .... 99
International recognition of this problem has unfortunately not
translated into any effective responses. Private codes frequently amount
to little more than vague statements of principles. They generally
include no complaint mechanism, and provide no grounds for legal
redress. While these soft law initiatives may be admirable, they are
wholly aspirational-with no power to compel compliance or punish
transgressors. Adherence to basic human rights norms is too important
to be left solely to voluntary compliance-it must be mandatory for "all
organs of society." Voluntary instruments can and do serve an impor-
tant purpose, but only if built on a bedrock of hard law protecting core
rights.' °
97. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter U.N. Norms]. Marking a sharp departure
from the Global Compact, the Norms might provide for some oversight and could impose an
obligation to pay reparations for failure to comply with its provisions. The Norms were adopted
unanimously by the UN Subcommittee in 2003 and sent to the UN Commission on Human
Rights. They are now subject of a year-long consultative process under the auspices of the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights.
98. See The Global Compact, Guide to the Global Compact: A Practical Understanding
of the Vision and Ten Principles, Human Rights Principle 1, available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/content/AboutTheGCTheNinePrinciples/thenine.htm (last
visited Feb. 21, 2005).
99. U.N. Norms, supra note 97, at 4. The U.N. Norms use the term Transnational
Corporation, or TNC. For consistency sake, I have changed the reference to TNE.
100. See Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New
Approach for a Different Legal Order, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 429 (2004); Steven R.
Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443
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C. Existing Criminal Responsibility for Corporations under Inter-
national Law
Having explored the strengths and weaknesses of the United States'
ATCA and various soft law instruments as solutions to corporate human
rights violations, we return to our starting point-international criminal
law. International law is already moving in this direction. Bassiouni
asserts a growing consensus around the principle of criminal responsi-
bility for legal entities, including penalties of damages, seizure and
forfeiture of assets.1"1 Of course, in the domestic law in the corporate
homes of most TNEs, financiers of criminal enterprises are routinely
held responsible for complicity in criminal activity.
TNEs are already treated as actors with rights under some inter-
national regimes and responsibilities under others.'0 2 For example,
Article 2(14) of the Basel Convention specifically defines "person" for
purposes of its criminal prohibitions as "any natural or legal person."10 3
Similarly, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions specifies that
state parties must ensure that the Convention's provisions are applicable
to legal persons." The Council of Europe's Criminal Law Convention
on Corruption requires parties to adopt the legislative measures neces-
sary to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for the criminal
offenses committed on their behalf.10 '
(2001); see also INTERNATIONALCOUNCILONHUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES
(2002), available at www.ichrp.org/ac/excerpts/41 .pdf.
101. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law and Human Rights, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 19 (Bassiouni ed., 1998).
102. Under NAFTA, for example, private investors have the right to bring the NAFTA
states to binding international arbitration. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,
1992, arts. 1115-1138 reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 605, 642-49 (1993).
103. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal, available at http://www.basel.int/text/con-e.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2005).
104. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, art. II, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/
21/0,2340,en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1ll,00.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). Although
the Convention does acknowledge the possibility that a state might not recognize criminal
liability for legal persons, in which case the state is to impose other sanctions. Id. art. HI(2).




Article 2 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism" prohibits "any person" from directly or
indirectly providing or collecting funds with the intention that they
should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or
in part, in order to carry out an act defined as terrorism. The explicit
language of the Convention is not limited to natural persons, and indeed
is clearly targeted at the acts of legal persons as well, though the
enforcement provisions are tailored to punishing individuals. The
convention marks the first time that financing terrorist activities will be
considered a crime by international law. 17 Breaking the otherwise usual
separation between financing and the international crimes that are a
result of that financing, Article 13 of the Convention requires parties to
regard the financing of terrorism as a full criminal act and not merely a
fiscal offense.'08
Finally, two security council resolutions (one predating, the other
post-dating, 9/11) make it clear that although the term terrorist is limited
to natural persons, those participating in funding terrorist activities, and
therefore subject to the provisions of the treaty, include legal persons. "
Similarly, President Bush's executive order on Terrorism Financing
applies equally to natural and legal persons."'
106. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A.
Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 54th Sess., Agenda Item 160, at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/54/109 (2000).
107. The council on Foreign Relations report on Terror Financing concluded that it is
Al Qaeda's viable financial network that permits it to pose a grave ongoing threat to the United
States. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TERRORIST FINANCING (2002), available at
http://www.cfr.org/pdf/TerroristFinancing.TF.pdf.
108. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra
note 106, at 8.
109. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N.
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001). In particular, the latter resolution obligates jurisdictions
to:
[f]reeze without delay funds and other financial assets... of persons who commit, or
attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of
terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons;
and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and
entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities.
Id. at 2.
110. Exec. Order on Terrorist Financing, (Sept. 24, 2001) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924- 1.html (See definition of person
including entity which is further defined to include corporations and other legal persons).
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CONCLUSION
Along with the ever increasing concentration of economic power in
the hands of TNEs has come a pressing need to develop legal checks
sufficient to deter their participation in international crimes. The inter-
national community may finally be taking the first tentative steps toward
holding legal persons criminally liable under general principles of inter-
national law. The furor over "blood diamonds" and the role that control
of natural resources have played in conflicts in Sudan, Congo and Sierra
Leone has given this task a new urgency. Sierra Leone War Crimes
Prosecutor David Crane has eloquently articulated the need to bring the
financiers of bloody conflicts giving rise to human rights and humani-
tarian violations within the scope of international law. He has repeated-
ly emphasized the economic forces driving and supporting many atro-
cities and war crimes, and has advocated bringing these economic actors
to account for violations of human rights law. 1 '
Similarly, ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo has indicated that his
office will consider the connections between TNE profiteering in the
Congo and massacres and other atrocities committed there. 112 Addi-
tionally, the panel of experts appointed by the United Nations Security
Council to investigate the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the
Congo recently proposed sanctions against implicated legal entities that
had violated the OECD guidelines, thus turning the soft law guidelines
into hard law.'13 The panel concluded in part:
175. By contributing to the revenues of the elite networks, directly or
indirectly, those companies and individuals contribute to the ongoing conflict
and to human rights abuses. More specifically, those business enterprises are
in violation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. There-
fore, the Panel recommends that the Security Council consider imposing
certain restrictions on a selected number of business enterprises and indivi-
duals involved in criminal and illicit exploitation that are identified in this
11. Crane, supra note 1.
112. See Panafrican News Agency Daily Newswire, ICC to Probe War Crimes in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, June 23,2004; War Crimes Court Eyes Blood Diamond Buyers,
REUTERS, Sept. 23 2003, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2003/
0923helpers.htm; ICC Targets Blood Diamonds, OTHER FACETS, Dec. 2003.
113. Final Report, supra note 19. The panel found the private sector to be instrumental
in the exploitation of resources and continuation of the war.
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report. The list emphasizes the implication of foreign enterprises as well as
nationals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the economic exploita-
tion. 114
States may be responsible for the conduct of TNEs that involve
human rights violations (either as a host state in whose territory the vio-
lations occurred or as a home state with an obligation to prevent trans-
gressions). Similarly, individuals may be held criminally responsible for
corporate acts over which they have knowledge and control. Both are
important components of the project to protect core human rights in this
ever-more globalized world. The third prong, the direct liability of
TNEs themselves, is equally critical if the edifice of international human
rights law is to stand.
The growing recognition of corporations as legal persons in domestic
and international law supports this claim. TNE criminal liability for
violation of non-derogable human rights would serve not only as an
important safeguard of those rights but also as a backdrop against which
soft law and compacts might be made effective. Because they bring the
potential for public censure, the threat of punitive damages and a more
fundamental sense of justice, criminal prosecutions are a necessary
grounding and counterpoint to soft-law initiatives.
This proposal would take international human rights and humani-
tarian law principles to their logical and necessary conclusion-that
TNEs and other legal persons can be held directly responsible for acts
of genocide or crimes against humanity. Without some international
legal standards, any response to allegations of corporate war crimes or
crimes against humanity will necessarily be ad hoc. Moreover, without
common international standards, a race to the human rights bottom will
be only too likely." 5
114. Id.at 32 (emphasis added). For a description of how such prosecutions might occur,
see Stephen Kabel, Our Business is People (Even if it Kills Them): The Contribution of
Multinational Enterprises to the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 12 TuL. J. INT' L
& COMP. L. 461 (2004).
115. For a description of what this race might look like, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P.
Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 54-55 (1999).
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